Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.
Introduction
Economists have been rather reluctant to deal with human rights. Jeremy Bentham, as a leading proponent of utilitarianism also a godfather of welfare economics, famously called them "nonsense on stilts". With the rise of the New Institutional Economics, attention of economists has moved towards the economic effects of institutions. Thus, the economic effects of human rights have moved on the agenda of economists. Yet, when rights are explicitly analyzed, many economists hasten to add that their primary interest is in economic freedom rights -not in political or civil rights and neither basic human rights. Quite to the contrary, they continue to argue, granting too many political or civil rights to individuals could even make the economy worse off.
To the best of our knowledge, the economic effects of the violation of basic human rights like imprisonment without trial, torture, political killings and the like have never been systematically analyzed. In this paper, a first such analysis is offered. The basic argument is very simple: in order for factors of production to become productive, a minimum amount of certainty is key. Violations of basic human rights often take place in a non-systematic, hazardous manner and can thus be interpreted as an indicator for the absence of some basic form of certainty. We thus expect that violations of human rights lead to lower investment which will, in turn, lead to lower rates of economic growth and thus to lower per capita income. The second contribution of this paper lies in distinguishing various groups of human rights in a broader sense (property rights, civil rights, social rights)and in asking what their individual contribution to various economic variables such as investment and productivity is and whether they re-enforce each other.
Political scientists have, of course, dealt with the issue of basic human rights before. The first studies treated human rights as the independent variable and asked for their effects on foreign aid programs of donor countries Pasquarello 1985, Stohl and Carleton 1985) as well as on immigration policy (Gibney and Stohl 1988, Gibney, Dalton, and Vockell 1992) . But human rights as the dependent variable seem to have received more emphasis over the last decade:
there are quite a number of studies trying to identify the variables that explain variation in the level to which human rights are violated by various governments (Poe, Tate and Keith 1999 is such a study and contains many references to earlier studies). Poe, Tate and Keith (1999) conclude that military regimes are connected with higher levels of human rights abuses whereas former British colonies are connected with lower levels. Involvement in war (both international and civil) is connected with higher degrees of human rights abuse whereas a high level of democracy as well as of economic development is connected with a lower level of abuse. Of late, legal scholars have joined the debate and asked whether ratification of international human rights treaties has a discernible effect on the abuse behavior of governments. Both Keith (1999) and Hathaway (2002) have found that, surprisingly, ratification is often connected with more, rather than less, abuses. 1 Recently, various structural characteristics of constitutions have been analyzed with regard to their economic effects: the relevance of electoral systems (proportional vs. majority) and the form of government (presidential vs. parliamentary) has been subject to analysis just as judicial independence (see Persson and Tabellini 2003 Our results show that high degrees of human rights are conducive to economic growth and welfare in a significant manner. Not all four groups of rights identified in this paper contribute, however, equally to explaining the variation of the various economic variables used here. Basic human rights and property rights are conducive to investment. Social or emancipatory rights do not have a discernible impact on investment. On the other hand, basic human rights do not have a discernible impact on productivity development. Here, property rights, civil rights and social rights have a clearly discernible impact. Nevertheless, none of the four groups of rights used in this paper ever has a significant negative impact on the economic variables used.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, the possible relationship between respect for basic human rights by governments and income and growth is spelled out in a little more detail. Section three contains a discussion of the data used as well as some descriptive statistics on the correlation between the measures of human rights abuses drawn upon here and other, related, measures. The estimation approach as well as the results are presented in section four. Section five concludes.
1
As was to be expected, this result has been met with heavy criticism by fellow international lawyers (Goodman and Jinks 2003) . Neumayer (2005) re-estimates some of the regressions and shows that ratification can marginally improve the human rights record of a country.
Some Theory
The Encyclopedia Britannica defines human rights as "rights that belong to an individual as a consequence of being human". The human rights scholar Louis Henkin (1990, 2f.) emphasizes the importance of four aspects with regard to human rights: (1) "Human rights are rights of individuals in society"; (2) Human rights are universal; they belong to every human being in every human society"; (3) "Human rights are rights" and (4) "Human rights are claims upon society."
Often, a distinction between negative and positive rights is made. Negative rights can further be delineated into rights establishing freedom from state or third party interference (such as torture, imprisonment without trial etc.) and freedom to do something (assemble with others, criticize the government in public etc.). Positive rights can include rights to food, housing, paid jobs etc.. We here propose to distinguish four groups of human rights, namely (1) basic human rights which include the absence of torture, the absence of political killings, the absence of people who disappear; they thus reflect freedom from state interference. (2) Economic rights, which include primarily private property rights broadly defined.
(3) Civil and political rights which include the unrestricted possibility to participate in political life, to travel, not to be censored by the government etc.. (4) Social or emancipatory rights which endow the individual with positive rights vis-à-vis the state. 2 As with most classification systems, distinctions between the four groups might not always be razor-sharp.
Negative rights can be interpreted as creating protected domains that not even the state is allowed to trespass. For democratically organized states, this implies that negative rights limit the possible scope of majority decision-making: if rights are really basic, even large majorities are bound by them and cannot simply ignore them. Negative rights can thus also be interpreted as a device to protect minorities against current majorities or as "veto rights", as they give their holders the right to behave in a certain way, even if a huge majority would like their holders not to act in that way.
From an economic point of view, negative rights can also be interpreted as limiting the scope of possible contracts that are legally enforceable via state institutions. To give an example: a slavery contract, even if voluntarily entered into by both parties, would be perceived as a violation of basic human rights in most legal systems. If parties entered into such a contract nevertheless, it would 2 Often, these rights are also called "economic, social and cultural rights" as in the International Covenant. We prefer to refer to them as social or emancipatory rights here as economic rights will be used in a different context indicating primarily the security of private property rights.
not be enforceable drawing on state courts and additionally, it would frequently be subject to a criminal trial. This means that basic human rights cannot only prevent the state from doing certain things, it can also restrict non-state actors in their behavior. Interpreted like this, basic human rights establish limits to the possible extent of private property rights that actors cannot even voluntarily renounce from. Hayek (e.g. 1976) takes up this traditional distinction between negative rights that create domains protected against trespassing and positive rights that endow their holders with a claim against the entire collectivity. One could, e.g., have a right to an interesting employment, to adequate housing etc. Hayek only quarrels with the second kind of rights because they can either be statements of desirability -in which case they should not be called rights as they are not legally enforceable -or the state can indeed try to enforce them, which would presuppose that the state be structured like an organization, i.e. with fixed goals and a hierarchy, which endows the superiors to tell the others what to do and what not to do. In short, Hayek believes that positive rights are incompatible with a free society, in which individuals determine their own position according to their own goals and means, but negative rights like basic human rights and property rights are welfare enhancing.
The interpretation of basic human rights as limits to the possible extent of private property rights annoys many economists because it seems to create areas that are exempt from efficiency calculations. If social welfare (however defined) can be increased by gently torturing criminal suspects, then a prohibition to do so due to basic human rights prevents the realization of efficiency gains. Prima facie, basic human rights thus seem to restrict the area to which the economic approach can be applied. Judge Richard Posner has been quite outspoken concerning the legal consequences of this theoretical insight: he has, e.g., argued that criminal suspects should not be granted extensive protection (1995, 76f.) and has advised less developed countries not to spend many resources on creating legal systems that comply with state-of-the-art standards (1998). The costs of basic human rights that judge Posner seems to have in mind are the higher costs of running legal systems (e.g. due to higher levels concerning the burden of proof) but also the higher probability that suspects who have indeed committed a crime are set free and thus constitute a danger to all potential future victims.
At considerable risk of oversimplification, Posner's position might be summarized as follows: the enforcement of basic human rights can prevent the realization of efficiencies which means that they can prevent a society from realizing points on the edge of the production possibility frontier. Attributing primordial importance to efficiency considerations can also lead one to point out that well-functioning market economies need not necessarily be democratic. The prerequisites for a well-functioning market economy were secure property rights. Democracies, however, enable majorities to vote in favor of redistribution, which can, at least passed some threshold, be interpreted as an attenuation of property rights.
Representatives of this position thus distinguish between economic rights from civil and political rights. They are convinced that it is economic rights that are crucial for economic development. Their support of civil and political rights is often rather lukewarm. Barro (2000, 47) has, e.g., argued that "U.S. advice to poor countries should focus more on the rule of law, property rights, and free markets, and less on the romance of democracy."
In a nutshell, three basic hypotheses with regard to the economic effects of the various kinds of rights can be distinguished: The Hayek hypothesis according to which basic human rights and property rights (negative rights) have a positive impact on welfare and growth, whereas a high degree of social rights (positive rights) would be counterproductive. The Barro-Posner hypothesis argues that there is an important sequence to be observed: first, only property rights are important, they would lead to improvements in income which would later allow societies higher levels in the other kinds of rights. Thirdly, the Sen (1999) hypothesis purports that freedom, fairness and reciprocity are important and that social capital (which is assumed to encompass elements of all four groups of rights distinguished here) has a positive effect on welfare and growth, which is, however, not necessarily measured in terms of monetary income only. Figure 1 depicts these competing hypotheses graphically.
It is argued here (somewhat following the Sen line of argument) that talk of various kinds of human rights makes little sense in the absence of basic human rights. To talk, e.g., of secure economic rights makes little sense if anybody can be imprisoned without a fair trial, can be tortured in order to induce him to plead guilty, can disappear, or can even be killed out of political considerations. The absence of these abuses is a crucial precondition that must be satisfied before talk of economic rights becomes meaningful. This does not only hold for economic rights but also for political and civil rights. The absence of the repression of basic human rights has also been called a "virtue of omission". With regard to the position shortly sketched here, one could talk of a "sin of omission" in the sense that its proponents must assume the very basic human rights to be enforced before talk of other, less basic human rights becomes meaningful. In demarcation from the positions shortly sketched here, we would like to develop two points, one conceptual and the other oriented towards empirical consequences: The conceptual hypothesis is that with an alternative -and broader view -of economics, the creation and enforcement of basic human rights can very well be integrated into a discussion within the frame of economics. The empirically testable hypothesis is that the enforcement of basic human rights has a positive impact on income and growth; it is thus at least partially conflicting with the Posner hypothesis.
Basic Human Rights as Part of the Economic Rationale
Representatives of Constitutional Political Economy do not take the basic rule set of a society for granted anymore but try to legitimize or explain it, depending on whether they belong to the normative or the positive branch (Voigt 2003 Dworkin's (1977) talk of "rights as trumps" is often interpreted as an abdication of economic calculus in favor of a principles-based approach. We have argued here that this is only true if one adopts a rather narrow view of economic reasoning which tries to maximize efficiency on the level of results. If economic reasoning is extended to the level of rules, rights as trumps can be integrated into the economic approach.
Basic Human Rights as Income Increasing
We now move on to the second hypothesis, which is that the respect of basic human rights cannot only increase (non-monetary) welfare (the argument just made) but also income and growth. This is an empirically testable proposition and we now set out to develop it in a little more detail. The basic argument is that the absence of abuses of basic human rights is a necessary condition for income and growth. If the state does not refrain from physically harming its citizens, their property rights to their own body are seriously infringed. Basic human rights are thus an indispensable precondition for secure property rights. The right to one's own body is a crucial precondition for making productive use of one's other resources. Uncertainty regarding the respect of basic human rights makes the return on investments -no matter whether with regard to human or to other capital -more uncertain. Lower investment rates and lower growth would be the logical consequence.
3 Sen (1999) but also Hayek (1960) have argued that there might be good reasons for guaranteeing basic human rights even if they were costly.
At the same time, it is important to stress that the respect for basic human rights is a necessary but almost certainly not a sufficient condition of economic growth and development. A state whose government strictly respects basic human rights but which does not secure for the protection of other property rights by adequate laws, efficient court procedures and the like will almost certainly not achieve high income levels. Yet, it is hypothesized that a state whose government protects property rights narrowly conceived and ensures efficient court procedure but does not respect basic human rights will also have difficulties in achieving economic growth. In terms of a production function, we thus hypothesize that this relationship could be expressed drawing on a Leontief production function in which respect for basic human rights cannot be substituted by anything else.
It has been argued (Farber 2002 ) that government respect for basic human rights can also be interpreted as a signal concerning the seriousness of government promises concerning other rights, such as property rights as conventionally conceived. If government does not refrain from physical harm vis-à-vis its citizens, why should it respect private property rights of foreign investors? If government respect for basic human rights functions like a signal concerning the credibility of its promises in general, the abuse of basic human rights should have consequences on (i) the creditworthiness of a country as well as on (ii) the amount of foreign direct investment attracted. Additionally, (iii) the general propensity to invest should also be lower than in countries in which governments respect basic human rights. These arguments can, however, be criticized on various grounds: in theory, it is, of course, possible that a regime completely respects the property rights of foreign investors while simultaneously using violence against its own citizens. China is a case that comes to mind. It could further be argued that potential FDI might be attracted especially into those countries with a poor record on labor, as this could be interpreted as a signal for weak protection of labor and, hence, cheap labor. On the other hand, the absence of basic protection could also increase the probability of violent protest and thus lead to instability, which is supposed to lead to less investment. It can even be suspected that the increased awareness with regard to human rights abuses in the traditional source countries of FDI can have an additional effect: If investment in human rights-abusing countries makes the investing company subject to public scrutiny -and possibly also lower sales -at home, incentives to invest might be further decreased. The theoretical considerations are thus partially contradictory and we will try to sort them out in the empirical part.
Arbitrary imprisonment and politically motivated killings will supposedly lead to a general climate of anxiety and fear. In order to be innovative, freedom from fear and anxiety seem to be important. It can thus be hypothesized that, c.p., the abuse of basic human rights should lead to lower levels of innovation. Again, a number of possible counter-arguments can be made: autocratic regimes have proven that they are not only able to allocate substantial resources into research and development, but that their scientists can also deliver results, witness the space program of the former Soviet Union. It can further be argued that research which involves disrespect of the dignity of man, can be carried out under the protection of autocratic rather than rule-of-law regimes.
The hypotheses presented so far have been concerned with the effects of the nonrespect of basic human rights for income and growth. Above, it was shown that there are a number of economists who are critical with regard to the broadening of the concept of rights to social rights, i.e. the move from negative to positive rights.
It can be argued that endowing citizens with such rights can have negative effects.
Two transmission mechanisms appear possible: (1) an extensive endowment of citizens with positive rights means that those rights only exist on paper but are not factually enforced which would induce negative consequences or (2) the state does enforce these rights, at least to some degree, but this requires that the size of the individual domains into which not even the state may enter needs to be reduced which would also have negative consequences. These hypotheses are, at least in principle, testable which is why we set out to describe them in a little more detail.
If the first mechanism were to prevail, this would mean that there was a gap between formally granted rights and their factual implementation or a divergence between de jure and de facto rights. 4 It can, of course, be argued that constitutions are only solemn declarations of aspirations and not enforceable documents but if one holds the position that constitutional provisions should be legally enforceable, then their factual non-enforceability can be conjectured to have negative effects.
Their non-enforceability can be interpreted as the non-fulfillment of promises made by representatives of the state. As a consequence, it can be hypothesized that a divergence between de jure and de facto rights will lead, c.p., to lower 4 This distinction is important for ascertaining whether human rights are institutions or rather policies. Institutions are supposed to be rather stable commonly known rules endowed with a sanctioning mechanism whereas policies are the consequences of policy choices that are supposed to take place within a given institutional frame. Policies can therefore change a lot faster than institutions. If human rights are entrenched within constitutions, they are meant to be institutions. If one observes that human practices oscillate heavily in short periods of time, this indicates that policies can change rapidly and that the constraints laid down in the constitution are often reneged upon. This means that de jure and de facto are not congruent. If the second mechanism were to prevail, i.e. if positive rights do not only exist on paper but are factually delivered, the problems just discussed will supposedly not
arise. Yet, another set of problems, which might have even worse effects, could arise. Hayek (1976) has emphasized that the creation of rights simultaneously means the creation of obligations. If people are given the right to work, to a paid holiday, to adequate housing etc., this means that those who are now obliged to enforce the rights must be given the means to do so. Society must be -in Hayek's words -transformed into an organization with overarching collective goals that trump individual goals. This means that in order to enforce social rights, the classical liberal rights have to be at least attenuated. It also means that extensive de facto positive rights are incompatible with a market economy. The Hayekhypothesis thus reads: The more extensive the degree of factually implemented social rights, the worse are, c.p., the growth prospects of a society. Hayek argues that negative rights and positive rights are competing with each other. 5
After this outline of some possible causal relationships between the abuse of basic human rights and their economic consequences, we are now ready to move towards the empirical test. Before doing so, we need, however, an indicator for our independent variable, namely for respect/abuse of basic human rights.
5
He writes (Hayek 1976, 103) : "From this it follows that the old civil rights and the new social and economic rights cannot be achieved at the same time but are in fact incompatible; the new rights could not be enforced by law without at the same time destroying that liberal order at which the old civil rights aim."
Description of the Human Rights Data
Measuring government respect and abuse of basic human rights is no mean feat.
Political scientists have developed and used a number of approaches. The one that seems to be most frequently used is based on two annual reports, one published by Amnesty International and the other one by the U.S. State Department. As both reports describe the human rights practices in a non-quantified way, the information contained in both reports needs to be coded. A standard proposed by Gastil (1980) All of these indicators have specific advantages and disadvantages. They all share some common problems though: reported human rights abuses are, of course, not identical with human rights abuses that factually occurred. It seems quite likely that a government with an outrageous human rights record will try to conceal its record as far as possible. Other countries that factually have less abuses but that also have a free press might be reported to fare worse than the country concealing its abuses. 7 Many datasets rely on U.S. State Department reports. These reports are also a political instrument and it cannot be excluded that states who are perceived as allies or who receive aid are viewed in a more favorable light than other states. Concerning the annual reports of Amnesty International, it has been noted that they have traditionally focused on those countries with the worst abuses, which would thus imply sample bias. It has, however, also been pointed
Report. Unfortunately, they calculated their measure for one year only, namely for 1984 -which makes time series analysis impossible. McCormick and Mitchell also use a five-point ordinal scale defined from 0 ("no violations") to 4 ("very frequent violations").
out that the recorded human rights violations of the two series have converged over time (Poe et al. 1999, 302) . 8 In order to deal with the various weaknesses of the data, we have decided to draw on a large variety of sources producing a very large dataset which is then compressed by factor analysis.
The 24 variables used as indicators of human rights abuses are described in table All (exogenous) rights variables have been chosen in such a way as to cover the period from 1990 to 1997 10 in order to be able to use lagged endogenous variables that cover the period from 1993 until 2000 (concerning investment and growth) or just the year 2000 (for productivity and human capital). This is important because it allows us to make inferences concerning (the direction of) causality.
8
An additional problem is that the variables are coded ordinally and that they do therefore not allow for the application of multivariate statistical methods as factor analysis or OLS-regression. In order to use those methods, we have to assume that there is equidistance between the various categories, i.e. we interpret the variables as scaled metrically. In the past years, quite a few researchers have used ordinal data for similar analyses.
9
A few missing values were imputed by hand to complete the data set for 137 countries, especially in the Fraser Institute data (modified Heritage data was used as a proxy for missing values in this case). Numbers of imputed data: Data Source A=0, B=4, C=2, D=0, E=2, F=24.
10
In each case the arithmetic mean for the available years was used as a proxy for the period 1990-1997. Testing up to 24 variables seems to make little sense, especially since some of them are highly correlated. This is why we first conducted a factor analysis the results of which are reported in table 2. A right angle rotation was carried out which has the advantage that no correlation among the extracted factors remains.
Additionally, interpretation of the results is easier than without rotation. We report only factor loadings that are larger than 0.3 (loadings larger than 0.5 are in bold figures). It is quite noteworthy that the four resulting factors are exactly in line with our theoretical conjectures, we will call them (1) basic human rights, (2) civil and political rights, (3) property rights, and (4) social or emancipatory rights. It is these four factors, which will be used as exogenous variables in the estimations to be described in the next section. 11
Factor analysis allows us to clearly keep the four theoretical concepts apart.
Within the four factors, it is not one single variable which drives the results but a mix of variables. Between the four groups, factor analysis has the advantage of zero correlation between the factors. This is why the regressions are based on these four factors and no alternative method is used (like the creation of an index, or the selection of the variables with the highest loadings). The correlations between the four factors and a host of other country characteristics are very plausible and the factors lend themselves to straightforward interpretation. Table 3 is a correlation matrix, which contains partial correlation coefficients of our four explanatory human rights factors with economic variables, other country characteristics, and country group dummies. The variables in the middle section named here as other country characteristics are variables to be explained as well as potential control variables. Of course, simple correlation analysis cannot substitute for regression analysis, which will be carried out in the next section of the paper. Yet, some correlations with economic as well as with institutional variables might be interesting in their own right.
11
There is a visible gap between the fourth and the fifth factor (the fourth factor has an Eigenvalue of 1,143 in the beginning and the fifth factor of 0,929). The 137 countries were grouped according to their factor values on the four factors Basic Human Rights, Property Rights, Civil Rights, Emancipatory Rights. Six dummy variables type A-F were generated, indicating with 1 that a country has a certain combination of strong/weak rights (as shown in the table). The attributes strong/weak are the results of a cluster analysis identifying one upper and one lower cluster for each of the four factors Basic Human Rights, Property Rights, Civil Rights and Emancipatory Rights (see appendix).
(1) All variables are coded the same way, so that low values mean low press freedom, democracy, size of government etc. (2) PWT 6.1 by Heston et al. 2002 (3) strong. This group is largely identical with the OECD member countries. OECD members that did not make it into this group are Korea, Japan, Greece, Mexico, Slovakia and Turkey. Costa Rica and Namibia are the only non-OECD members that were grouped here. Figure 2 gives an impression of the geographical distribution of the six country groups.
The correlations with economic variables like GDP per capita, the average investment in percent of GDP as well as growth suggest that a country needs to have a certain combination of human rights to enhance economic welfare.
Countries with strong basic and civil rights but no property rights have lower GDP per capita and lower investment. Countries with strong property rights and weak basic human rights have lower human capital and no significant advantages in growth or output per worker. This hints at the possibility that Hayek's argument claiming that negative rights (basic and property rights) are a necessary condition for economic performance might be right.
With regard to the role of emancipatory rights, it is interesting to compare the performance of the countries in group E (weak emancipatory rights) with those in group F (strong emancipatory rights). Simply glancing at the correlation coefficients, one could claim that emancipatory rights do not seem to be a necessary condition for economic growth. Yet, GDP per capita, investment and human capital seem to be higher in group F. Additionally, happiness surveys (collected by Veenhoven 2004) indicate that people in Type F countries are significantly more happy than in type E countries. The avarage of happiness studies conducted in the 1990s in countries of type F reaches a value of 7.0 on a transformed 10-0-scale and in that of type E countries of 6.2. The difference between the two groups is statistically significant on the one percent level. One could start to wonder whether a high degree of emancipatory rights will only be supported by an economy past a certain threshold. This question can, however, not be answered by drawing on correlation matrices. We will therefore take it up in the next section drawing on regression analysis. This section serves to test whether government respect for basic human rights as well as the other three groups of rights used here has any significant impact on economically relevant variables. It further serves to identify possible transmission channels through which the four groups of rights could have an impact on welfare and growth. Figure 3 serves to illustrate our procedure: we start by estimating the direct influence of the four human rights factors on welfare and growth. We actually constrain ourselves to estimating the effects on growth. Alternatively, the effects on the values of the human development indicator or output per worker could be estimated but growth has the advantage of only taking the change of income during a specific period into account -and not to include developments that have occurred over a number of previous periods. The results of this regression are displayed in table 5. The next step is to inquire into possible transmission channels based on the determinants of growth as pointed out by modern growth theory. We estimate the effects of human rights on investment (as a proxy for capital), the return on average schooling (as a proxy for human capital and knowledge) and overall productivity (as a residual). The results are reported in tables 6, 7 and 8. This approach is in line with Hall and Jones (1999) . The output of a Cobb-Douglas production function is disaggregated into the components capital, labor and productivity residual and all possible channels through which the institutional variables could influence them are estimated.
Traditionally, the first variable of interest to economists has been economic growth. Remember that Poe et al. (1994 Poe et al. ( , 1999 found the wealth of a country to be an important determinant for the degree to which governments respected human rights. It has been hypothesized in section two that causality might be reversed: respecting human rights might lead to higher wealth. In order to exclude the possibility that we simply replicate the findings of Poe et al. Haiti and Hungary were consistent outliers. We took them off the sample as there might have been some data problems with regard to these two countries. The estimation approach itself is straightforward and follows the method used in modern empirical growth studies. It is basically a variant of the Extreme Bound Analysis first used in growth theory by Levine and Renelt (1992) . Here, we do not report the extreme bounds but different estimation results providing for the extreme bounds. According to this approach, the following equation is estimated: (ii) Ethnic fractionalization because it is often significant but also because it can be interpreted as a proxy for unfavorable general conditions in poorer countries and (iii) contract-intensive money as this is a good proxy for highly developed financial markets which can primarily be found in highly developed economies.
Countries that protected property rights better during the first half of the 1990s grew faster during the period 1993-2000 (table 5 ). This result remains significant after the variables that Poe et al. (1994 Poe et al. ( , 1999 found to be significant to determine the level of human rights respect are controlled for, namely democracy, population size, leftist government, military control, British cultural influence, international wars and civil wars. Columns 4 and 5 display only four of these
13
A two-stage least-squares estimate using the various ascertained by Poe et al. (1999) as determining the human rights record of a country as instruments leads to similar results.
variables, the results for the other variables are not significant either. The result is also robust to the inclusion of other variables like press freedom, corruption, openness, size of government, inflation and so on (column 3 offers ethnic fractionalization as an example). But the results are driven by the upper two thirds of the sample, in the lower third, institutions seem to play a rather minor role. 14 That property rights have a strong positive impact on growth has been shown in a number of previous studies (e.g. Knack and Keefer 1995 , Roll and Talbott 2001 , Claessens and Laeven 2003 and will thus not be discussed in any more detail here. The basic human rights factor displays a positive t-value but does not reach a conventional level of significance. This might be due to the substantial business cycle variations that occurred in the 1990s. We assume that business cycles are also the main reason for the low R² and the problem of omitted variables in columns 1, 2 and 3, where the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test reveals that the residuals are not normally distributed. Introduction of additional control variables takes care of the problem of omitted variables, but the R² is still unsatisfactorily low.
The problem of business cycle variation when using growth rates as an indicator for economic welfare is addressed by Hall and Jones (1999) . They propose to use GDP per capita or GDP per worker instead and also point out how the transmission channels can be revealed when decomposing GDP per worker in three factors representing capital stock, human capital and productivity. With regard to the transmission channels we follow their approach here. 15 14 Glaeser et al. (2004) have argued that the hypothesis according to which good institutions cause growth rests on rather shaky conceptual foundations as well as unconvincing evidence. They argue that human capital is a more basic source of growth than are institutions. Poor countries would get out of poverty by good policies -even pursued by dictators -rather than by good institutions. Their argument will, however, not be discussed further here.
15
Different from Hall and Jones (1999) , we estimate a different baseline model for every transmission channel, using those exogenous variables that have been shown to be significant for the specific endogenous variable under consideration and adding a host of control variables thus checking for robustness. Hall and Jones use total factor productivity as the dependent variable and a single index of social infrastructure (formed as the average of an index of government antidiversion policies and an openness measure) as the right hand side variable. In an IV approach, the social infrastructure index is then based on exogenous instruments. This approach is based on the bold assumption that social infrastructure (i.e. the quality of institutions) primary influences output per worker through an increase in total factor productivity which we prefer not to work with here. (1) PWT 6.1 by Heston et al. 2002 (2) Data from Barro and Lee 1993 (3) Data from Poe et al. 1999 covering the years 1976-1993 (4) Alesina et al. 2003 . The table shows the ß-coefficients of the regression, the numbers in parentheses are the absolute values of the estimated t-statistics, based on the White heteroscedasticityconsistent standard errors. '**', '*' or '(*)' show that the estimated parameter is significantly different from zero on the 1, 5, or 10 percent level, respectively. SER is the standard error of the regression, and K.-S. the 2-tailed P of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov-test on normality of the residuals.
There are a number of potentially relevant transmission channels through which the respect for human rights could influence the overall level of wealth in a country. It could influence the formation of physical capital as well as the formation of human capital. But it could also influence their respective productivities as well as the overall productivity of the production function. We now set out to analyze some of these transmission channels empirically and begin by investment (in physical capital). More specifically, we ask whether government respect for the various rights factors is a significant variable for explaining (logged) average investment in percent of GDP between 1993 and 2000 (table 6 ).
Here, the vector M is made up of three variables, namely (1) the physical capital stock in 1988 16 , (2) the openness of the economy that is to reflect the possibility that investment might be caused by participating in the international division of labor, and (3) the size of the population as investment could be caused by the size of the market or the potential thereof. Column 1 shows that these three variables explain some 48% of the variation in average investment. Adding the four rights factors increases the fit to 57.4% (column 2). It is noteworthy that basic human rights, property rights, and civil rights are all significant on the 1 percent level, whereas emancipatory rights are insignificant, i.e. neither are they conducive to investment nor do they seem to hinder it. We tested for the robustness of these influences by adding the 21 control variables mentioned above; again, only some of them are reported in columns 3, 4 and 5 of the table. Note that incorporation of some controls further increases the explanatory fit of the model. 17 Basic human rights and property rights always remain significant whereas emancipatory rights remain insignificant. Significance of civil rights decreases below conventional levels when the quality of financial institutions is controlled for. Again, the result is primarily driven by the upper two thirds of the sample, in the lower third, other regularities might apply.
16
Which was estimated by Hall and Jones (1999) using the perpetual inventory method in countries with investment data going back at least to 1970. They assume a depreciation rate of 6 percent. Missing data for countries like Croatia, Ukraine, Slovakia were imputed by taking the data of the "mother countries" USSR, Yugoslavia and CSSR. The use of per-capita GDP (as e.g. proposed by Chakrabati 2001 with regard to foreign direct investment) instead of physical capital stock does not change the outcomes in a relevant manner.
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There is, however, a small problem of multicollinearity. The correlation between the size of the population and openess is -0.622. The exact strength of the influence of the exogenous variables could therefore be biased. (1) PWT 6.1 by Heston et al. 2002 (2) Hall and Jones 1999 (3) Alesina et al. 2003 (4) Data from Poe et al. 1999 covering the years 1976 -1993 (5) Clague et al. 1999 . The table shows the ß-coefficients of the regression, the numbers in parentheses are the absolute values of the estimated t-statistics, based on the White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. '**', '*' or '(*)' show that the estimated parameter is significantly different from zero on the 1, 5, or 10 percent level, respectively. SER is the standard error of the regression, and K.-S. the 2-tailed P of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov-test on normality of the residuals.
After having dealt with investment (in physical capital) as endogenous variable, we now turn to human capital. The human capital variable is based on the average number of years that citizens above the age of 15 of the respective country spent in schools. It is assumed that school attendance is subject to decreasing returns.
Accordingly, the first years spent in school are supposed to lead to higher returns than the last years spent there. Like Hall and Jones (1999) , we assume a rate of return of 13.4 percent for the first four years of education, of 10.1 percent for the next four years and of 6.8 percent for education beyond the eighth year. The student teacher ratio proves to be of extraordinary explanatory power concerning human capital formation. It alone explains more than 60% of the variation in human capital. Adding our four rights factors does not significantly improve the explanatory fit of the model although basic human rights is the only factor that is significant at the 5 percent level. As soon as the dummies for British influence, military regimes and leftist regimes are introduced (column 4) or countryintensive money is controlled for (column 5), its significance decreases below conventional levels. Instead, civil, emancipatory and property rights become significant.
This result does not lend itself to a straightforward interpretation. As before, the results are driven by the two thirds of the countries with the highest income. In the poor third of the countries, neither basic human rights in columns 1 to 3 nor property rights, civil rights or emancipatory rights in columns 4 and 5 are significant. Different from tables 5 and 6, the equations are not robust here when M and HR are controlled for by the Z-vector. The basic human rights factor in columns 2 and 3 might be less an indicator of basic human rights than of the quality of financial institutions in the wealthy countries (column 5).
Amongst the high-income countries, the differences in property rights, civil rights and emancipatory rights seem to be an independent factor influencing the level of human capital. This is, however, only the case if the quality of economic institutions is controlled for. If one runs a model with the 71 richest countries of the entire sample (i.e. those with a log GDP per capita that was larger than 6 in 1990) which contains the student teacher ratio and the quality of financial institutions (CIM) as the baseline model and one adds the HR vector in a second step, one observes that the R² increases from 0.63 to 0.72 which is a considerable increase. Clague et al. 1999 . The table shows the ß-coefficients of the regression, the numbers in parentheses are the absolute values of the estimated t-statistics, based on the White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. '**', '*' or '(*)' show that the estimated parameter is significantly different from zero on the 1, 5, or 10 percent level, respectively. SER is the standard error of the regression, and K.-S. the 2-tailed P of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov-test on normality of the residuals.
It might, however, be the case that property rights, civil rights and emancipatory rights are really measuring something else like the quality of institutions or policies of the richer countries. This cannot be excluded because as soon as GDP per capita in 1990 is controlled for, the HR variables lose their significance. It might thus be the case that the teacher student ratio variable approximates differences in the infrastructure of the education system only insufficiently and by using other proxies, the significance of property rights, civil rights and emancipatory rights in explaining differences in the stock of human capital among the rich nations might vanish altogether. This possibility gets some support if an alternative proxy for human capital and knowledge is used, namely the number of patents per million. If one estimates a model in which patents serve as the endogenous variable and the number of people employed in R&D as the exogenous variable, the explanatory fit does not markedly increase if the human rights variables are added on the right hand side. 18 We have ascertained the impact of the four rights factors on investment in both physical and human capital. In order to better understand possible transmission channels, we now turn to possible influences of our rights factors on productivity. If, alternatively, the number of internet users per million inhabitants is used as a proxy for the education level of a country, all four human rights variables have a significantly positive influence, even after including all the control variables of the Z-vector and the student teacher ratio, the number of employees in R&D and GDP per capita. Caution seems, however, warranted when drawing on the number of internet users as this seems to be some diffuse measure for the general development of a country rather than a variable specifically suited to measure the degree of human capital or knowledge available in a country.
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Hall and Jones (1999) assume a production function Y i =K i α (A i H i ) 1-α with Y i =Output per worker in country i (taken from the Penn World Tables), K i =stock of physical capital in country i (its calculation is described in footnote 17), H i =amount of human capital-augmented labor used in production in country i (the assumed rates of return are described above, p. 30) and A i =labor-augmenting measure of productivity in country i. After rearranging the equation, A i as the residual is calculated assuming α to be 1 / 3 . In estimating the influence of the HR-vector on the productivity residual, we refrain from estimating a baseline model as the influence of the physical capital stock as well as human capital on the variation in output per worker should already be captured by decomposing output per worker into its basic determinants.
It is thus plausible to assume that differences in institutions are the primary and fundamental determinant of differences in productivity. 20 In this approach it is, of course, crucial to control for the possible influence of other institutional arrangements via the Z-vector.
Following this approach, property rights, civil rights and emancipatory rights all have a strong significant positive impact on productivity (table 8) . Basic human rights never reach conventional significance levels. Significance levels remain virtually unchanged after controlling for the 21 variables of the Z-vector.
Property, civil, and emancipatory rights remain significant on the one percent level in each specification while basic human rights remain insignificant (at least at the 5 percent level).
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This is in analogy to the Hall and Jones hypothesis according to which social infrastructure is the primary and fundamental determinant of total factor productivity. With regard to investment, type D countries (i.e. countries with a weak record on basic human rights) also fare worse than countries of types C, E and F that all have strong basic human rights. The third column also re-enforces earlier results:
none of the country types is particularly conducive to human capital formation.
Concerning productivity levels, three country types are highly significant with country type F displaying an overwhelming influence on productivity. (1) PWT 6.1 by Heston et al. 2002 (2) Modified Hall and Jones 1999 (3) Data from Barro and Lee 1993 (4) World Development Report. The table shows the ß-coefficients of the regression, the numbers in parentheses are the absolute values of the estimated t-statistics, based on the White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. '**', '*' or '(*)' show that the estimated parameter is significantly different from zero on the 1, 5, or 10 percent level, respectively. SER is the standard error of the regression, and K.-S. the 2-tailed P of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov-test on normality of the residuals. The countries were grouped according to their factor values on the four factors Basic Human Rights, Property Rights, Civil Rights, Emancipatory Rights. Six dummy variables type A-F were generated, indicating that a country has a certain combination of strong/weak rights (s=strong, w=weak, x=not determined). The country group A is used as reference category here. The attributes strong/weak are the results of a cluster analysis identifying one upper and one lower cluster for each of the four factors Basic Human Rights, Property Rights, Civil Rights and Emancipatory Rights (see appendix)
Figure 4 sums up our results: basic human rights have a strong positive influence on the accumulation of physical capital and should thus have a positive influence on economic welfare and growth (which we could not prove here with regard to the growth rates of the 1990s). Property rights have strong impacts on growth as well as on the accumulation of physical capital and total factor productivity, but not on the accumulation of human capital. Civil and emancipatory rights, in turn, positively influence total factor productivity and should thus have a positive influence if not on growth than at least on welfare in a broader sense (which we could not prove here either). For future studies, two approaches seem to recommend themselves in order to shed further light on our basic question: on the one hand, one could try to remain within the cross-country frame but rely on indicators for welfare other than growth. These could, e.g., include real per capita income, output per worker, the human development indicator or happiness coefficients. Drawing on the correlations presented in table 3 above, we suspect that the results with regard to the Sen-hypothesis might improve. Within such an approach, the business cycle problem would be mitigated, yet other problems like that of structural constancy would pop up. On the other hand, time-series analysis might make sense in which business cycle influences could be controlled for by drawing on year fixed effects.
Conclusions
Our regressions seem to confirm that none of the four human rights factors derived from a factor analysis has any significant negative impact on welfare and growth. Would this result convince those who have expressed their skepticism with regard to granting a full bouquet of entrenched rights to citizens? Supposedly not as they could point to the fact that our results are primarily driven by the upper two thirds of our sample. In order to understand the relationship between rights and growth in poor countries better, it might therefore make sense to focus on the analysis of the bottom third of our country sample.
On the other hand, would our results make those who have argued in favor of basic human rights as well as civil rights begin to be skeptical concerning their theoretical priors? Supposedly not either as numerous authors (among them
Hayek as well as Sen) have argued in favor of basic human rights irrespective of the directly measurable economic consequences. We have tried to show above that this need not necessarily be outside the realm of economics but can be incorporated if people attach value to be treated decently.
